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Abstract
Auction theory analyses market designs by assuming all players are fully rational. In this
paper we study behavior of bidders in an experimental launch of a new advertising auction
platform by Zillow, as Zillow switched from negotiated contracts to using auctions in several
geographically isolated markets. A unique feature of this experiment is that the bidders in
this market are local real estate agents that bid in the auctions on their own behalf, not using
third-party intermediaries to facilitate the bidding. To help bidders, Zillow also provided a
recommendation tool that suggested the bid for each bidder.
Our main focus in this paper is on the decisions of bidders whether or not to adopt the
platform-provided bid recommendation. We observe that a significant proportion of bidders
do not use the recommended bid. Using the bid history of the agents we infer their value,
and compare the agents’ regret with their actual bidding history with results they would have
obtained consistently following the recommendation. We find that for half of the agents not
following the recommendation, the increased effort of experimenting with alternate bids results
in increased regret, i.e., they get decreased net value out of the system. The proportion of agents
not following the recommendation slowly declines as markets mature, but it remains large in
most markets that we observe. We argue that the main reason for this phenomenon is the lack
of trust that the bidders have in the platform-provided tool.
Our work provides an empirical insight into possible design choices for auction-based online
advertising platforms. While search advertising platforms (such as Google or Bing) allow bidders
to submit bids on their own and there is an established market of third-party intermediaries
that help bidders to bid over time, many display advertising platforms (such as Facebook)
optimize bids on bidders’ behalf and eliminate the need for the bidders to bid on their own
or use intermediaries. Our empirical analysis shows that the latter approach is preferred for
markets where bidders are individuals, who don’t have access to third party tools, and who may
question the fairness of platform-provided suggestions.
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1 Introduction
Auction theory analyses market design by assuming all players behave fully rationally, and the
outcome is a (Bayes) Nash equilibrium of the game. Some recent work, such as Nekipelov, Syrgkanis,
and Tardos (2015), suggests to replace this assumption for repeated games (such as ad-auctions)
with modeling the players as learners, assuming they use a form of no-regret learning in repeated
games to find the best strategy to play. No-regret learning can be implemented with less available
information, but the assumption is still modeling agents with a strong form of rationality, and
using high level of data analytics. This assumption is well justified in auctions where bidders use
strong tools for data analytics, or have a market place of third-party intermediaries to facilitate
the bidding, and bidders invest enough in the market to pay for the analytics. Bidders in these
market places use algorithmic bidding tools, and such tools do optimize rationally, and hence are
much less subject to human biases.
In this paper we study bids in an experiment with auction where bidders are humans, each with
relatively small investment, and were not using algorithmic tools. In such auctions, the reality may
challenge the above assumptions. The actions of human bidders, not assisted by strong analytical
tools, may be affected by issues not considered in classical auction theory: the bidders will lack
information and lack the attention needed to make rational decisions, and may also be effected by
behavioral biases that are not accounted for in the standard theory.
Our data comes from an experimental launch of a new advertising auction platform by Zillow.
Zillow.com is the largest residential real estate search platform in the United States used by 140
million of people each month according to the company’s statistic ZillowInc. (2016). Viewers are
looking to buy or sell houses, want to see available properties, typical prices, and learn about
market characteristic. The platform is monetized by showing ads of real estate agents offering
their services. Historically, Zillow used negotiated contracts with real-estate agents for placing
ads on the platform. In the experiment we study, several geographically isolated markets were
switched from negotiated contracts to auction based pricing and allocation. The auction design
used was a form of generalized second price, very similar to what is used in many other markets
except that agents were paying for impressions (and not only for clicks). A unique feature of this
experiment is that the bidders in this market are local real estate agents that bid in the auctions on
their own behalf. This is unlike many existing online marketplaces where bidders use third-party
intermediaries to facilitate the bidding. Along with the new auction platform, Zillow provided the
bidders the recommendation tool that suggested the bid for each bidder based on the inputs of this
bidder’s target parameters (e.g. impression volume, budget, and competing bids of other bidders).
The main focus of our paper is understanding the bidder’s decision whether or not to adopt the
platform-provided bid recommendation. Bidders were required to log into the system if they wanted
to change their bid, and once they logged in, the system offered a suggested bid: the recommended
bid for maximizing the obtained impression volume for the bidders’ budget. Our main conclusion
is that the bidders lack trust in the recommendation, and both bidders and the platform would
have been better off if the system didn’t offer bidders the opportunity to avoid the recommended
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bid.
Our main metric for the analysis of the bidders’ bid sequences is the average regret measuring
the difference between the average utility that was achieved by the bid sequence and the utility
from the best fixed bid in the hindsight. A fixed bid is not actually optimal in this environment, as
bidding differently on different days of the week would have been beneficial for the bidders. However,
regret for a fixed bid with hindsight seems to be the most fair comparison, as the recommendation
tool was essentially making fix bid recommendations (a limitations of its design), and the bidder’s
behavior seems to be well approximated with looking for a good fix bids: they didn’t update bids
frequently enough to take advantage of the opportunities varying with the days of the week.
We observe that a large proportion of bidders does not use the recommended bid to make bid
changes immediately following the introduction to the new market. Our main finding is that the
observed bid sequences that deviated from recommended bids didn’t typically result in smaller
average regret than the recommended bid. In other words, even though many bidders attempted
to adjust bids on their own, and they had the opportunity to gain over the recommended bid in
terms of overall value (by bidding differently on weekdays and weekends), many bidders would
have been better off by always using recommended bid. The number of bidders who outperformed
the bid recommendation in our study is about the same as the number of those who did worse.
The proportion of bidders following the recommendation slowly increases as markets mature, but it
remains large in most markets that we observe. We argue that the main reason for this phenomenon
is the lack of trust that the bidders have in the platform-provided tool.
An important challenge in understanding the data is the uncertainty in the bidders values for
each impression. Most bidders in this market are limited by small budgets, and as a result their
bid, even if interpreted as a fully rational learning behavior, may not have enough information to
infer the value of the bidders. We use the the learning based inference of Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and
Tardos (2015) to infer the agent’s values based on their bidding behavior, and then compare this
regret, to the regret on this inferred value, had the follow the platform’s bid recommendation. Note
that the regret inferred for the bidders behavior is a lower bound on the actual regret: the value we
infer for the player is the value that would give them the smallest possible regret. Our results show
that under this value, they would have less regret had they adopted the platform recommendation.
Our work provides an empirical insight into possible design choices for auction-based online
advertising platforms. Search advertising platforms (such as Google or Bing) allow bidders to
submit bids on their own and there is an established market of third-party intermediaries that
help bidders to bid over time. This market design allows for more complex bidding functions, for
example allowing agents to express added value for subsets of the impression opportunities via
multiplicative bid-adjustments (e.g., based on the age of the viewer). In contrast, many display
advertising platforms (such as Facebook) use a simpler bidding language, and optimize bids on
bidders’ behalf based solely on their budgets. This eliminates the need for the bidders to bid
on their own or use intermediaries. Our empirical analysis shows that, despite its more limited
expressibility, the latter approach may be preferred for markets where bidders are individuals who
don’t have access to third party tools, and who may question the fairness of platform-provided
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suggestions.
Related Work Number of papers in recent years focus on estimating bidder’s value in online
advertising auctions. One the earliest papers in this area is Athey and Nekipelov (2010), who study
bidder values in Bing’s GSP auction for search ads. They use the equilibrium characterization of
GSP, and find that the bidders utility functions are smooth and strongly convex as the function of
their bids. This ensures that if bids are at equilibrium, bidder valuations are uniquely identifiable
based on the bid. In dynamic or new markets where interaction is repeated, the value of each
individual interaction is small, and bidders are not (yet) knowledgeable about the system, it is better
to model players as learners. Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015) suggest this assumption for
studying bidders in Bing’s market for search ads, and shows how to infer values based on bidding
behaviour under this weaker assumption on the outcome. To evaluate the effectiveness of the
bid-recommendation tool for the bidders, we need to estimate their value for impressions. We
do this using the methodology developed in Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015), making the
assumption that agents are low-regret learners.
In a recent paper Nisan and Noti (2016) the authors report on a human subject experiment
on the reliability of regret based inference. In their experiment, human subjects participated in
bidding games (including the GSP format). The paper asks the question if human behavior can be
modeled as no-regret learning, and to what extent the inference based on the low regret assumption
can be used to recover the bidders value from their bidding behavior. Their finding are mixed. They
find the players whose value is high behave rationally, experiment with the best bidding behaviour,
achieve very low regret, and inference based on this assumption accurately recovers their value. The
finding for players with low types is less positive. Some participants in the experiments were given
values so low, that rational behavior would have them drop out of the auction (or bid so low they
are guaranteed to lose). Such low value players were frustrated by the game, and behaved rather
irrationally at times. It is interesting to think about the contrast between the participants in the
Nisan-Noti laboratory experiment and the agents in the Zillow field experiment. The players in the
Nisan-Noti experiment were paid to participate (even if frustrated), while in contrast participation
in Zillow’s ad-auctions is optional, and for typical real estate agents Zillow may not be the main
channel through which they get the “client leads”. Frustrated agents can drop out, and in fact,
there were many short lived agents in our data. We focus our analysis on agents that stay in the
system for an extended period of time. In addition, we note that Nisan and Noti (2016) as well
as Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015) identify the value with smallest regret error relative to
the value. This method favors larger values, that make the relative error smaller. Using the value
with smallest absolute error would have made the identification mode successful even for bidders
with relatively smaller values. This is the method we will use in this paper.
A distinctive feature of Zillow’s field experiment was that the bidders were provided the bid
recommendation tool. Such tools are not unique to Zillow and are routine in search advertising on
Google and Bing such as in GoogleInc (2016). Agarwal, Cui, Ghosh, and Ostrovsky (2016) report
experiments with adding bid-recommendations at LinkedIn, where they find that the advertisers
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and the publisher both benefit having recommendations. On those platforms there is also a set
of third-party tools (not provided by platforms) that facilitate bidding. However, on Zillow the
bidders were faced with the choice between trusting the recommendation provided by Zillow’s tool
or learning on their own. Our work thus bridges the gap betwen the literature on empirical analysis
of algorithmic learning in games and the literature on recommender systems without trust (e.g. see
Ricci, Rokach, Shapira, and Kantor (2010) for a survey of the latter).
2 Auction design
Background. Zillow.com is the largest residential real estate search platform in the United States.
Like all of the big search platforms, it is “consumer-facing”: it offers consumers free interactive
information about the current real estate listings, historical data on real estate sales, real estate
valuation for the properties that are not currently for sale, the background local demographic
information that includes average incomes, age and education of residents as well as the measures
of qualities of local schools. Similar to other Internet based services, Zillow’s business is based on
monetization of consumer page views by selling advertisement opportunities. Whenever a consumer
clicks on particular property from the list of the search results, the page that opens gives details
on the property. In addition, on the right side and at the bottom of the page, a list of real estate
agents are shown. A sample page is shown on Figure 1. The first agent on the list is always a
listing agent for the property that that consumer has clicked on (if the property is for sale). The
rest of the agents listed (highlighted as “premier agents”) are real estate agents advertising their
services to consumers viewing the listed property page. At the time period when we collected our
data, only three premier agents were shown per page and the list of premier agents was identical
on the side and at the bottom of the page.
Figure 1: Sample property search result on Zillow.com with highlighted premiere agents
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Premier agents buy impressions from specific zip codes that they selected. Once the system
identifies the agent’s eligible for a given impressions, the agents shown on the page in random order.
As a result, in expectation all impressions in the given zip code have the same value (in contrast
with Google where bidders are ordered by their bid, and higher positions are viewed as better).
Historically, as on many other consumer platforms on the Internet, these impressions were sold
through negotiated contracts between Zillow and the real estate agents.
In order to improve fairness and efficiency of the market, in the period between 2012 and 2015
Zillow engaged in a series of long-term experiments in which for a set of select geographically
distinct zip codes across the United States, the negotiated contract system for selling impressions
was replaced with auction-based system. The goal of these large scale experiments was twofold.
On the one hand, the platform wanted to study the revenue impact of switching from rigid system
of long-term fixed price contracts to a dynamic auction system that allows the impression prices to
change in real time. On the other hand, they wanted to use the bids to understand the discrepancy
between the negotiated prices and the agent’s values for impression.
The auction format used for the experiments was generalized second prize (GSP) auction for
the slots of available ad positions. Recall that the ad delivery system randomizes the order of the
agents and so keeps all impressions the same expected quality for each agent. Maybe the most
natural mechanism would be to simply select the three highest bids, and price them at the uniform
price of the 4th bid. However, Chawla, Hartline, and Nekipelov (2016) shows that the use of
uniform price mechanism may limit the quality of inference of bidder values from the bids, and
a form of discriminative price mechanism, such as the GSP, allows for better inference of values.
To distinguish the agents by their bid, for the agents with a bit lower bids, Zillow’s mechanism
decreased the probability of the agent’s ad getting places on the page. Below we outline the
structure of the implemented mechanism and the structure of static best responses of bidders.
The mechanism. The mechanism implemented in the large scale experiments run by Zillow can
be characterized as
• real-time, with ads places in real time as opportunities arise
• weighted, higher bids have a higher chance of being shown,
• agents are paying per impression, unlike the per-click payment used for search ads
• generalized second price auction
• with reserve prices and budget smoothing.
In this mechanism each bidder i submits her bid bi and (typically per month) budget, though agents
are allowed to submit budgets for shorter periods, and some do. The auction platform takes fixed
position “weights” γj . These weights are used by the platform to induce the dependence of the
impression allocation on the rank of each bidder’s bid: weights sum to 1, and the agents with jth
highest bid is shown with probability 3γj on a page, so 3 agents are shown on each page. The
weights used in the system are 0.33, 0.28, 0.22, 0.17, so only the highest 4 bids have a chance of
being shown.
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Real-estate agents typically have relatively small budgets, so the system needs to implement a
form of ”budget-smoothing” or pacing to have the agents participate in auctions evenly across the
time interval. For each bidder j, the system determines a budget-smoothing probability pij , that
in expectation will ensure that the agents don’t overspend their budget.
The mechanism then implements the GSP taking into account bidders’ budgets. In each impres-
sion opportunity this is done as follows:
1. The advertiser database is queried for all bidders eligible to be shown in a given impression
opportunity, that is, advertisers bidding on the ZIP code of the property
2. For the set of eligible agents, the system determines the filtering probabilities for budget
smoothing. To do this, the system needs to estimate the expected spent of the agent given
her bid bi. This turns out to be a fixed point computation, as each expected spend depends
also on the filtering probabilities of other agents.
3. the remaining bidders are ranked by the order of their bids
4. Three of the top four remaining bidders are displayed, so that the probability that the ad of
bidder ranked j is shown is 3γj
5. If the bidder ranked j is shows, she pays the bid of the bidder ranked j + 1 (or the reserve
price) for the impression.
To avoid having to deal with ties, Zillow effectively implemented a priority order via assigning each
agent ”quality score” very close to 1, to determine the order of agents with identical bids.
We describe the details of budget smoothing, and analyze the properties of the auction mecha-
nism from the expected impression perspective. Although, this gives a simplified view of the system
(e.g. avoiding dynamics and the fluctuation of the impression volume), that allows to discuss the
incentives in the auction mechanism in the most crystallized way. If NP is the total number of
page views in thousands over the time period of the bidder i and B¯i is the total budget of the
bidder, then the per thousand impression opportunity budget can be expressed as Bi = 3 B¯i
/
NP.
This reflects the fact that on each page there are 3 ad impression opportunities for 3 available slots
and each bidder can only appear in one of the three slots. We further assume that the bidders are
risk-neutral and have quasi-linear utility, so their utility is characterized by values per thousand
impressions vi.
In the per impression context the budget smoothing process can be characterized by a prob-
ability pii that determines eligibility of bidder i for an auction. Conditional on not being budget
smoothed, bidder i participates in a generalized second price auction. Since all bidders may be
budget smoothed, the group of auction participants becomes random. As a result, the auction
outcomes for bidder i (her rank j, and so the probability γj that her ad is being shown, as well
as her price per impression) are random. Taking expectation over the budget smoothing of other
agents, we can construct the expected auction outcomes: eCPMi(bi) is the expected cost per a
thousand impression opportunities. Note that this expectation is also a function of the other bids
b and the budget smoothing probabilities pi of opponent bidders, a dependence that we will make
explicit in notation when useful. Similarly, the probability of the impression being shown is also a
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random variable which we denote by eQi(bi). We note that both these objects are defined via the
conditional expectation, i.e. they determine the spend and the impression probability conditional
on bidder i not being budget smoothed. The impression eligibility probability is determined by the
balanced budget condition:
pii = min
{
1,
Bi
eCPMi(bi)
}
. (2.1)
Note that if the expected per impression spent does not exceed the per impression budget, then
such a bidder should not ever be budget smoothed.
Best Responses. Now we can characterize the structure of the bidder’s utility and the best
response bid. When eCPMi(bi) < Bi, the expected utility per impression is determined solely by
the expected auction outcomes, i.e.
ui(vi, Bi, bi) = eQi(bi) vi − eCPMi(bi).
Classical analysis of such an economic system would assume that the outcome is a Nash equi-
librium of the game, where each bidder maximizes her utility by setting the bid. Due to lack of
space we will skip here the details of the resulting equilibrium analysis. We note that identifying
the right bid can be challenging for the bidders, who are real-estate agents, and often don’t have
the data or the analytic tools to do a good job optimizing their bid. To help the advertisers, the
platform provides a bid recommendation, suggesting the bid that maximizes the expected number
of impression the agent can achieve based on her budget.
Budget smoothing (Pacing). Budget smoothing is one of the most technically challenging
components of the implemented experimental mechanism. For large advertisers on platforms like
Google, budgets typically play a minor role essentially working as “insurance” from surges in spent
generated by idiosyncratic events. In contrast, advertisers on Zillow are real-estate agents, and
typically have small monthly budgets relative to per impression cost. In particular, our data shows
that virtually all bidders are budget smoothed over certain periods.
In these settings a carefully constructed system for budget smoothing is essential. Take the
vector of current eligible bids and budgets for bidders i = 1, . . . , I. The idea for recovering the
filtering probabilities will be to solve for a set of probabilities pi1, . . . , piI such that (2.1) is satisfied
for each i. The main ingredient in computing pii is the expected cost per opportunity eCPMi(bi)
with expectation taken with respect to the distribution of pi1, . . . , piI of other bidders, and eQi(bi)
is the probability of being shown conditional on not being filtered out. In Appendix A we give the
algorithmic description of the computation of pii’s.
3 Market environment
Data description. In the period between 2014 and 20161 Zillow has run a series of large-scale
experiments where the mechanism for selling ad impressions was switched from negotiated contracts
1We withhold the exact start and end date of the experiments for confidentiality purposes
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to auctions. During this period, Zillow defined markets as zip codes. The real estate agents were
not allowed to use targeting within the zip code (i.e. by advertising only on the pages of specific
real estate listings) or buy “packages” of impressions across multiple zip codes. In fact, a vast
majority of real estate agents that we observe in the data only compete for a single zip code.
The experiments were rolled out in a large number of clearly isolated markets with zip codes
coming from either separate states or sufficiently far from each other within the state. In order
to facilitate this experimental mechanism rollout, Zillow has engaged in a significant marketing
and training effort to ensure that real estate agents in the experimental markets understand the
structure of the auction and to help agents learn how to bid well in the auction, akin the set of
tutorials provided by Google for its advertisers.
Our data comes from 57 experimental markets from Zillow. These markets are close to the
entirety of markets that were switched to auction-based prices and allocations. We dropped a
few markets from the data that either did not have reliable data due to possible malfunction of
the implementation of the auction mechanism, or the data span was too short to produce reliable
results. For data confidentiality purposes all dollar-valued variables, such as prices and budgets, in
our data were re-scaled and do not reflect the actual amounts.
Our structural analysis in this paper will be concentrated on the much smaller set of 6 very
active markets. Our goal in selecting these markets was to (i) ensure that those markets are
sufficiently geographically separated, yet have the typical statistical properties of all markets, such
as impression prices, in all characteristics except the activity of agents; (ii) have sufficient number
of observations of bid changes for different bidders. To understand the behavior of bidders in these
auctions, we need to infer their values. Agents that are not active on the platform, do not provide
enough data to reasonably estimate their value. As it will become clear in Section 4, the second
part is crucial for us to be able to produce reliable evaluation of payoffs and bidding strategies of
the agents. To select the 6 markets, we first filter the markets where the number of participating
agents is 15 or less, which gets down the number of regions from 57 to 12. The average frequency of
bid changes per day in these regions was 0.43. The 6 markets we use for our structural estimation,
are the markets with above average number of bid changes.
In Table 1 we display basic statistics from our data. The table contrast the statistics for our
selected 6 markets with the statistics of the entire set of 57 markets that we analyzed. Presented
statistics correspond to the number of participating bidders, their bids and budgets, period of time
when the bidder is active in an auction (i.e. has the bid above the reserve price and did not exhaust
the budget), daily frequency of bid changes and the market reserve prices. The Table indicates
that our selected 6 markets have similar values of monetary variables (e.g. average bid of 23.9 in
selected markets vs. 18.8 in the entire set of markets and average daily budget of 8.9 in selected
markets vs 9.2 in the entire set of markets). However, there are two key statistics that are clearly
different in our selected set of markets: the time-average number of participating bidders (19.3 in
selected markets vs. 10.7 in the entire set of markets) and the average frequency of bid changes (.7
per day in the selected markets vs. .3 per day in the entire set of markets).
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Variable Selected Regions All Regions
Mean STD 25% 75% Mean STD 25% 75%
Number of agents 19.33 2.29 18.0 20.75 10.74 5.32 6.0 15.0
Bids 23.94 14.14 17.3 19.31 18.79 9.71 14.06 23.84
Budgets (daily) 8.92 3.0 6.31 11.71 9.22 4.96 5.9 12.44
Active duration 85.97 10.38 78.03 91.5 96.04 20.74 86.53 107.33
Reserve price 11.65 7.03 7.99 10.74 13.39 9.55 6.0 16.93
Bid changes 0.73 0.26 0.54 0.85 0.22 0.28 0.03 0.32
Impression Volume 5.52 1.72 4.25 5.89 5.29 3.19 2.73 6.89
Table 1: Basic information for all regions and the selected regions. The impression volume’s unit
is 1000 impressions per day. Bids, reserve prices and budgets are also per 1000 impressions. Active
Duration is in days. Bid changes is the average number of agents that change their bid per day in
a region. The average of bids, budgets and active duration has been calculated for each agent first
and then their averages has been taken over all agents of each region.
This means that while the per impression values in our selected markets should be similar with
those in the entire set of experimental markets, our selected markets have more intense competition
and, therefore, we would expect smaller markups of the bidders and faster convergence of bidder
learning towards the optimal bids.
Our data also contains the predicted monthly impression volume for the month ahead (from the
start date of each bid). This estimated impression volume is an input in Zillow’s bid recommenda-
tion tool whose goal is to compute the bid that will guarantee that the bidders wins impressions
uniformly over time, and wins the maximum expected number of impressions for the future month
for the given budget. To address the issue of uniform service Zillow implemented budget smoothing
explained in the previous section.
An important takeaway from Table 1 is the magnitude of the relative scale of bids and budgets of
bidders across the markets. As it is typical in display advertising the impression bids are expressed
per mille (1000 impressions). To make the monthly budgets comparable, we convert the budgets to
the same scale. The striking fact is the small scale of budgets relative to the bids. We note that we
computed daily budgets for bidders using the period they were active, which is often only a subset
of time. Note also that for most bidders these are their true monthly budgets (i.e., they did not
increase their budgets to gain more impressions). This in contrast with the evidence from sponsored
search advertising (on Google or Bing) where budgets declared to the advertising platform are often
not binding. This means that the issue of smooth supply of impressions to each agents becomes one
of the central issues of the platform design. The platform needs to engage in active management of
eligibility of bidders for auction impressions to ensure that each bidder participates in the auctions
at uniform rate over time.
Due to limitations of the data collection, we do not have the data for eligible user impressions
for the entire duration of our auction dataset. In order to properly analyze the auctions, we need
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the data on the impressions for each bidder for which that bidder was eligible including those that
she wasn’t served. For most of the period we only have Zillow’s estimate for user impressions,
and only have the actual impression volume for three months. For this period we noticed that
impression volume fluctuates with the days of the week, as shows on Figure 2, while the estimated
impression volume doesn’t show such fluctuation.
Figure 2: Impression volume fluctuations in weekdays shown for 6 regions with the most number
bid changes. The impression volume of each region is normalized by the average daily impression
volume of that region.
To address this data deficiency, we take the predicted volume of eligible impressions (which
is the most reliable proxi for the total number of eligible ad impressions). Using the seasonal
modulation (mostly reflecting the intra-week changes of the impression volume) that we observe in
the detailed impression records, we augment the impression volume predictions to produce a more
reliable proxi for daily user impressions. This generates a realistic pattern for daily impressions for
the entire time period that we observe.
Data Processing. Zillow’s experiments were designed not just to evaluate the performance of
auctions in selected markets per se, but also to compare key characteristics of monetization and
impression sales in the incumbent mechanism with negotiated contracts and the new auction mech-
anism. To provide data for credible comparison of these variables (which we do not analyze in this
paper) Zillow did not convert entire markets to auctions. Instead, a fixed proportion of impressions
was reserved for fixed price contracts and the remaining inventory was released to the auction-based
platform. In each market Zillow selected several agents that were brought to the auction platform
(and who were not allowed to buy impressions from fixed contracts in the same markets). Towards
the end of our period of observation, more agents were getting enrolled in the auction markets. For
most of those new agents the period of observation is too short for statistically valid inference. As
a result, we chose to drop such short-living agents.
11
In our structural inference we study the success of agents’ bid adjustment over time. We find
that a key characteristic of agents is the frequency by which they update bids. On Figure 3 we plot
the histogram of the distribution of daily frequency of bid changes for all agents across 6 markets.
The histogram shows fairly spread distribution of frequencies, close to uniform between the once-
a-month update to once a week update with some agents updating the bids more frequently.
Figure 3: Histogram of bid change frequencies across the 6 selected regions.
However, the analysis of frequency of bid changes within individual markets shows much less
concordance in the bid update frequency across bidders. In fact the frequency of bid changes turns
out to be the key variable that allows us to cluster the bidders into distinct types. We run k-mean
clustering algorithm using the bid change frequency variable to partition the agents inside each
region into 3 clusters, agents in cluster 1 and cluster 3 have the lowest and the highest number
of bid changes per day respectively. This allows us to give a straightforward interpretation to the
types identified by the cluster. If the bid changes are triggered by the benefit of the bid change
out-weighting the cost of the bid change, then the three clusters can be interpreted as identifying
the the bidder with high, medium and low cost of bid changes.
The results of clustering are demonstrated in Table 2. The results show fairly balanced cluster
sizes across markets with the high and medium cost clusters containing the largest number of
bidders and the lowest cost cluster containing the smallest number of bidders (less than a quarter
of bidders).
Auction simulator. Unfortunately, the system only logged actual delivered impressions for each
bidder, and didn’t log if a bidder lost the impression due to being outbid, or being filtered, etc.
Given this limited data, we cannot evaluate system directly from the data. Instead, we need to
simulate it by emulating Zillow’s budget smoothing process. This simulation is the key component
of our data processing strategy that will further allow us to perform structural estimation.
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Region # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of agents 20 23 18 21 16 18
Average bid changes per day 1.23 0.91 0.65 0.54 0.54 0.51
Selected agents in clusters 1,2,3 5,5,4 5,6,4 6,5,1 3,2,2 8,3,3 3,6,1
Table 2: Basic information for the 6 selected regions. Filtering removes the agents that are in
auction for less than 7 days or do not change their bid at all.
We calculate the outcome of the ad-auctions separately for each region. For each day, we find
the set of agents who have active bids in that day, as well as their bid, their daily budget (which
is calculated from the monthly budget and the leftover from the previous days), and the region’s
reserve price. We use this information to simulate the auction for that day by calculating each
agent’s filtering probability (pii), expected payment and expected share of that day’s impression
volume. It is important to note that while we don’t analyze data from short lived agents, they are
included in the simulation.
One of the main challenges of the system as well as our simulation is to find the filtering
probabilities. We describe the details of the algorithm in Appendix A. Recall that the filtering
probabilities need to satisfy equation 2.1, where eCPMi(bi) is a function of the filtering probabilities
of other agents. We find an approximate solution to these fixed point equations by minimizing the
sum of squares using Newton’s method.
I∑
i=1
(
pii −min
{
1,
Bi
eCPMi(bi;pi1, . . . , piI)
})2
with respect to pi1, . . . , piI .
The main time consuming step of each iteration is the need to compute the expected cost
(eCPM) and expected impressions share (eQ) for all agents with the given probabilities pi. In
Appendix A we show how to do this in O(|I|) time (assuming that the bids of the agents are
sorted).
4 Empirical analysis of market dynamics
The dynamics of the adoption of the bid recommendation tool. We study the adoption
of the bid recommendation tool designed to help the bidders to transition from the fixed price
contracts to the auction-based system for impression pricing and delivery. The recommendation
tool provided a simple interface that allowed the bidders to submit their monthly budget for a
specific market and the tool would provide the bid that maximizes the number of impressions
that could be purchased within the month with the given budget. The tool would adjust the
recommendation with any change that occurs in the system, such as the arrival of the new bidder,
changes of bids by existing bidders, or the change in the predicted number of market impressions.
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Figure 4: Average fraction of time agents follow
the recommended bid across the selected regions.
Figure 5: Average fraction of time agents follow
the recommended bid separated by clusters.
During the market rollout Zillow made the agents aware of the tool’s existence and explained
the principles that were used to design the tool. However, despite the outreach and marketing work
when auction platform was introduced to the set of experimental markets, the actual utilization
rate of the tool was initially low.
On Figure 4 we display the percentage of time when recommended bid was used by a given
agent for the bid change over agent’s tenure in the auction platform averaged over all agents in the
experimental markets. The figure shows that when agents were introduced to the platform they
tend to use the recommendation tool for less than 50% of their bid changes. This number tends to
grow to almost 100% as the agent is exposed to the auction platform for more than 5 months.
Figure 5 presents the same trend of utilization of the bid recommendation tool but decomposed
by clusters. Recall that we cluster bidders based on their bidding frequency with cluster 1 being
the cluster with the lowest frequency of bid changes and cluster 3 being the cluster with the highest
frequency of bid changes. Figure 5 shows the persistence of the trend with the relatively low
utilization of the bidding tool when the agents are just introduced to the auction platform with an
increased degree of this utilization as the agent spends more time bidding in the auctions. We note
that this trend is most rapid for the cluster of bidders with the highest frequency of bid changes.
These bidders start using the bid recommendation tool for almost all of their bid changes after 3
months of exposure to the auction platform. At the same time the bidders that are least frequently
changing their bids do not get to the point of fully using the recommendation tool even after 5
months of experience with the auction platform.
We further illustrate the persistence of this trend across the 6 markets that we study in the
Appendix. Figure 16 in the Appendix confirms the consistency of the aggregate trend of the
utilization of bid recommendation tool with those trends in individual markets. Moreover, for
some markets the percentage of utilization of the bid recommendation tool is even smaller than
that on average especially for the bidders that change their bids the least frequently.
This leads us to two important observations. First, the bidders in all observed markets were
willing to “experiment” with their bids by deviating from the recommended bid. The proportion of
bids devoted to experimentation is large especially when the agents are newly introduced to auction
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markets and remains large among the bidders that do not frequently change their bids even after 5
months of them bidding on the auction platform. Second, even though the bid recommendation tool
was designed to optimize bids on behalf of the bidders, the bidders did not have the full faith that
the recommendations benefit them (as opposed to the auction platform). The increasing adherence
to the recommended bid is observed only after the bidders experiment with alternative bids for a
sufficiently long time.
Next we try to understand if the bidder’s learning and experimentation behavior results in
improved outcomes, or rather simple helps them trust the platform’s recommendation.
Trust in system-provided bid recommendations. To evaluate the bid adjustment in the
Zillow’s auction markets we use the methodology developed in Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos
(2015). For understanding the first months of experimenting with auctions, we believe that it is
best to model them as off-equilibrium. A characteristic feature of this market that we analyze in
this paper is the relatively small stakes (measured in terms of per impression prices relative to
the budgets). In such markets exploration is a good way to learn the best response. For agents
who change their bid relatively frequently, we model their behavior as no-regret learning which then
allows us to infer their value using the notion of the rationalizable set from Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and
Tardos (2015). In dynamically changing market bids will vary over time and would not necessarily
maximize utility at each instant. Each bidder will then be characterized by two parameters: her
value and the average regret that evaluates the success of the dynamic bid adjustment. We measure
regret as the difference between the time-averaged utility attained by bidder’s bid sequence and
the average utility attained by the best fixed bid in hindsight. Average regret of a player reflects
the properties of bidder’s learning algorithm used.
We now consider a dynamic environment where the active bid of the bidder participates in
many auctions for impressions. We assume that time is discrete. At each instance t bidder i with
bid bit and outstanding bids of other bidders ~b−i,t faces an allocation eQ(bit,~b−i,t; θt) and payment
eCPM(bit,~b−i,t; θt) produced by auction outcomes for user impressions that arrived at time t. Here
θt are “environment” variables that reflect time-varying characteristics such as the rate of arrival
of user impressions, budgets and budget smoothing probabilities. In our further discussion (where
it does not affect mathematical clarity) we use simpler notation eQit(bit) = eQ(bit,~b−i,t; θt) and
eCPMit(bit) = eCPM(bit,~b−i,t; θt) leaving the dependence of allocations and spent from competing
bids and environment variables implicit. Then we can express the utility of bidder i at instance t
as
uit(bit, vi) = vieQit(bit)− eCPMit(bit).
The notion of utility allows us to define the average regret of bidder i.
DEFINITION 1 (Average Regret) A sequence of play that we observe has i- average regret
for bidder i if:
∀b′ ∈ B : 1
T
T∑
t=1
uit(bit, vi) ≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
uit(b
′, vi)− i (4.2)
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The introduced notion of the average regret leads to the following definition of a rationalizable
set under no-regret learning (or more precisely, small average regret learning).
DEFINITION 2 (Rationalizable Set) A pair (i, vi) of a value vi and error i is a rational-
izable pair for player i if it satisfies Equation (4.2). We refer to the set of such pairs as the
rationalizable set and denote it with NR.
To implement the construction of the rationalizable sets we choose a grid over the bid space and
construct half-spaces generated by inequalities (C.7) for each bid on the selected grid. On Figures
6 we show the structure of the rationalizable sets for 3 of the bidders most frequently changing
their bids in region 1. The structure of the rationalizable set is similar in all the 6 markets we
analyzed, see the corresponding figures 17-19 in the appendix. The vertical axis on these plots is
the per impression value of the bidder (expressed in monetary units) while the horizontal axis is
the additive average regret.
Figure 6: Rationalizable set for 9 agents most frequently changing bids in region 1
We note a dramatic difference in the shape of these sets with the rationalizable sets for the
bidders in advertising auctions on Bing estimated in Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015).
While the rationalizable sets in Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015) have smooth convex
shape, the rationalizable sets for the agents on Zillow are polyhedra. This is due to a much higher
degree of uncertainty for the bidders on Bing (induced by variation of estimated clickthrough rates
and user targeting across user queries) that smooths out the boundary of the rationalizable set.
Another important observation is the highly concentrated set of hyperplanes that pass through
the origin for many the bidders in the observed markets. In fact, as we mentioned before, agents’
budget constraints on Zillow are binding for most bidders with the per impression bids exceeding
the per impression budgets. This means that for those budget constrained bidders there is a set of
bids that correspond to them completely spending the budgets (i.e. that all have identical expected
spent). Thus regret of these agents is determined only by how many impressions each fixed bid with
a binding budget generates but not their spent implying that vi
1
T
∑T
t=1 (eQit(b)− eQit(bit)) ≤ i,
which for each bid b is the half-space that contains the origin. For bidders who spend their budgets,
the small regret constraint of the rationalizable set does not give any upper bound on their valuation:
these bidders are constrained by their budget, and not by their value of each impression.
In our further analysis we focus on the specific point of the rationalizable set that corresponds
to the pair of value and regret where the observed bid sequence has the smallest possible average
16
Region reg 1 reg 2 reg 3 reg 4 reg 5 reg 6 cl 1 cl 2 cl 3 all
worse 21.4% 20% 8.3% 0% 21.4% 50% 23.3% 25.9% 6.7% 20.8%
better 42.9% 20% 41.7% 28.6% 21.4% 20% 46.7% 22.2% 6.7% 29.2%
equal 35.7 % 60% 50% 71% 57.1% 30% 30% 51.8% 86.7% 50%
Table 3: The percentage of agents that do worse (or better) with their bids than following the
recommendation. The three columns on the right of the table offer aggregate statistics across the
6 markets segmenting agents by the frequency they update.
regret. Since the average additive regret and the value are expressed in the same monetary units,
we can directly compare them. A simple visual analysis of plots of rationalizable sets on Figures 17-
19 indicates that while for some bidders the smallest rationalizable average regret is small relative
to the corresponding value, there is a large number of bidders with high relative regret. This is
particularly pronounced for the bidders with cone-shaped rationalizable sets. From the economic
perspective, this shape indicates that a small change in the bid for those bidders from the applied
bid would have resulted either in a significant increase in the number of allocated impressions or
in a significant drop in the per impression cost.
We want to understand why agents may not be following the platform provided recommendation:
do they use a different bidding strategy as that improves their obtained utility, or is it simply a
question of lack of trust? We note that the bid-recommendation tool didn’t take into account the
weekly impression volume fluctuation shown on the figure in Section 3, so with bidding differently
on weekdays and weekends, the agents could have done better than the recommendation, and in
fact would be able to achieve negative regret.
To evaluate regret, we need to infer the agents value for the impression. The rationalizable set
offers a convex set of possible value and regret pairs. We use the value with smallest rationalizable
additive regret as our selected value, but to display the values in context, we also want to account
for two features. First, it useful to measure regret relative to bidder’s value (i.e. the bidders may be
prone to evaluate the “loss” associated with their learning strategies in the increments of the total
“gain”). Second, it is also convenient to normalize the regret by the the number of impressions the
agent won, so we measure “per impression” regret.
In Table 3 we show summary statistics on whether agents would decrease or increase their
regret by not using a platform recommended recommendation in each of the 6 markets. All regrets
are computed using the value we inferred using the agent’s own bid. Whenever we say that the
regret of a bidder’s learning strategy is the same as the regret of the recommended bid either
her own learning strategy is as good as the recommended bid or that she simply adhered to the
recommended bid. The overall distribution of the regret difference indicates that sizeable fractions
of bidders both have the regret that exceeds the regret of the recommended bid and the regret that
is smaller than that if the recommended bid was used. We also show the same statistics by regions
and clusters, where cluster 3 are the agents who update their bids most frequently.
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We further illustrate this point on Figure 7. The distribution of differences between the regret
of agents’ own bidding strategy and the recommended bid is close to symmetric about zero for
all markets that we study. This indicates that even though the bidders chose to experiment with
their bids, the experimentation did not necessarily lead to an improvement of regret over the
recommendation. In fact, about a half of the bidders have worse regret from their deviating
strategy than they would have had if they always chose the recommended bid.
Figure 7: Distribution of difference between the regret of own bidding strategy and recommended
bid across agents in selected markets separated by the percentage of time the agent follows the
recommendation.
One a priori possible explanation for why agents don’t follow the platform recommendation is
that the recommended bid does not provide satisfactory outcomes for the agents and switching
to an alternative bidding sequence improves their long-run performance. Figure 8 shows that this
hypothesis is not consistent with the data. On average, the agents who use the recommended bid
less do not show any improvements over the recommended bid measured by the average regret.
Combining this information with the previous observation of an increasing trend of utilization
of bid recommendation tool, we conclude that the key element that explains our results is the trust
of the agents in the platform-provided bid recommendations. While the bid recommendation tool
is optimized for the agents, upon entry to the platform the agents do not trust the tool. Instead,
they experiment with alternative bids and compare the performance of those deviating bids with
the performance of the recommended bids that they also occasionally choose. Once the agents
empirically verify that the tool indeed optimizes the bids on their behalf, they start using the tool
for most of the bid changes.
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of difference between the regret of own bidding strategy and recommended
bid across agents and the percentage of time agents use the recommended bid. The dashed line
shows the best linear fit.
Conclusion. Our conclusion is that the agents have sacrificed the performance of their advertising
budgets over a long period of time just to ensure that choosing the recommended bid over some
other alternative bid does not make them worse off. In this case, it would have been optimal both
from the perspective of the long-term welfare of the agents and from the perspective of stability of
prices on the platform to simply default all bidders to recommended bids.
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Appendix
A Algorithmic description of computation of budget-smoothing
probabilities.
The following steps outline our budget smoothing algorithm:
1. Sort the bidders i by their bid bi and assume bidders are numbered in this order.
2. Construct an array of 2I binary I-digit numbers from {0, 0, . . . , 0} to {1, 1, . . . , 1}where the
number N = nN1 n
N
2 . . . n
N
i . . . n
N
I will correspond to bidders j with n
N
j = 1 not being filtered
out. Call the set of elements in this array N
3. Take a subset of elements of N where i-th digit is equal to 1. Call this set Ni
4. Let N = nN1 n
N
2 . . . n
N
i . . . n
N
I with n
N
i = 1 and n
N
j ∈ {0, 1} be a specific row in Ni, corre-
sponding to the outcome of filtering when the agents with nNj = 1 remained.
5. Include the bid of each bidder j for whom nNj = 1,and determine the price of bidder i, calling
it PRICENi which is the maximum of the reserve price, and the bid bj first agent j > i with
nNj = 1. Let j
N
i be the position of agent i after filtering, and let γ
N
j the corresponding
probability γjNi
.
6. Compute the expected spent as
eCPMi(bi;pi1, . . . , piI) =
∑
N∈Ni
γNi
∏
j 6=i
pi
nNj
j (1− pij)(1−n
N
j ) PRICENi .
7. Solve for pi1, . . . , piI by solving a system of nonlinear equations
pii = min
{
1,
Bi
eCPMi(bi;pi1, . . . , piI)
}
, i = 1, . . . , I.
For instance, we can find an approximate solution by minimizing the sum of squares using
gradient decent or Newton’s method.
I∑
i=1
(
pii −min
{
1,
Bi
eCPMi(bi;pi1, . . . , piI)
})2
with respect to pi1, . . . , piI .
The main part of the above iterative algorithm for finding a fixed point is to compute the
expected cost (eCPM) and expected impressions share (eQ) for all agents for a given set of prob-
abilities pi1, . . . , piI . Considering all subsets of agents, this can take exponential time in number of
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agents. We to to run the simulations for every day and each region separately and we need to com-
pute these many times to get the filtering probabilities, these calculations can significantly increase
the running time of our simulations. Furthermore, for auctions where the number of agents is big,
using an exponential time algorithm to calculate the outcome of each iteration is not feasible. In
order to get around this issue, we use the fact that in each underlying GSP, only impressions of
the first four agents are eligible to be shown, as well as the fact that the filtering probabilities of
agents are independent. Our algorithm to find expected cost (eCPM) and expected impressions
share (eQ) for given filtering probabilities runs in linear time (in number of agents).
For each agent i ∈ [I], our algorithm first computes the expected impression share of the agent
eQi (assuming she has not been filtered). Note that eQi only depends on the number of unfiltered
agents (r) that have a higher bid than i and the probability (γr+1) associated with i’s rank. We
first find the probability that there are exactly r ∈ [0, 3] number of agents with higher bid than i,
called pi,r(pi). By multiplying pi,r(pi) by the impressions of the (r + 1)-th position (γr+1) we can
find the expected impression share of agent i.
After finding the expected impression share of i, we calculate eCPMi by using eQi. In order to
do this, we use the fact that the filtering probabilities of agents are independent. Furthermore, the
expected cost per impression for agent i is only a function of bids of agents who are bidding lower
than i and their filtering probabilities. So by calculating the expected cost per impression and
multiplying it by the expected impression share of agent i, we can calculate her expected payment
conditioned on i being in the auction (eCPMi). Recall that for each agent i, eQi and eCPMi are
calculated conditioned i not getting filtered, so in order to calculate the total expected number
impressions that she wins in the auction and her expected spent, it is enough to multiply eQi and
eCPMi by pii. In algorithm 1 we have marked these steps for each agents.
If this algorithm is implemented naively, the most expensive computation is computing pi,r(pi)
for all the agents. For each agent, it takes O(I3) to find all the configurations where there are
r ∈ [0, 3] agents who are not filtered and have higher bid than i. For each configuration, it
takes O(I) to compute its probability. By using dynamic programming, we can compute pi,r(pi)
from pi−1,r(pi) by considering the cases where agent i is getting filtered and is not getting filtered
separately. For initialization, we set p1,0(pi) = 1 and p1,r(pi) = 0 for 0 < r ≤ 3. We use the following
update rule to computer pi,r(pi) for i > 0:
pi,r(pi) =
(1− pii−1)pi−1,r(pi) r = 0(1− pii−1)pi−1,r(pi) + pii−1pi−1,r−1(pi) 0 < r ≤ 3
This reduces the running time of computing pi,r for each agent from O(I
4) to O(1). The
calculations for finding CPM and eCPM can be done in a similar way: instead of computing
eCPM for each agent from scratch, we can compute the expected price per impression from the
previous calculations. When i = 1 (she is the highest bidder), or pii = 1 (she is never getting
filtered), first, we set the expected cost per impression to 0 and find the smallest j > i such that
pij = 0. Then, for each k ∈ (i, j], we find the probability that all the agents z ∈ (i, j) are getting
filtered and k is not getting filtered (qi,k(pi)), multiply it by bid of k (bk) and add the result number
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ALGORITHM 1: Calculating eCPM and eQ of agents in linear time.
Input: b: bids (sorted) , pi: filtering probabilities, γ: rewards, reserve: the reserve price
Output: eCPM, eQ
1 Let {1, 2, . . . , I} be the list of all agents such that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bI ≥ reserve
2 Let p1,0(pi) = 1 and p1,r = 0 for 0 < r ≤ 3
3 for i ∈ [I] do
4 if i > 1 then
5 Let pi,0(pi) = (1− pii−1)pi−1,0(pi)

Calculating pi,r(pi)
from pi−1,r(pi)
6 for r ∈ [1, 3] do
7 Let pi,r(pi) = (1− pii−1)pi−1,r(pi) + pii−1pi−1,r−1(pi)
8 Let eQi = 0
9 for r ∈ [0, 3] do
 Calculating expected impression shareeQifrom pi,r(pi)
10 eQi = eQi + γr+1.pi,r(pi)
11 Let j = i+ 1
12 Let CPMi = 0
13 if i = 1 or pii = 1 then
14 while j ∈ [I] and pij < 1 do
15 if j = i+ 1 then
16 qi,j(pi) = pij
17 else
18 qi,j(pi) =
pij(1−pij−1)
pij−1
qi,j−1(pi)
19 CPMi = CPMi + bj .qi,j(pi)
20 j = j + 1

Calculating cost per impression
21 else
22 CPMi =
CPMi−1−piibi
1−pii
23 if j = I + 1 then
24 if i = I then
25 qi(pi) = 1
26 else
27 qi(pi) =
1−pij−1
pij−1
qi,j−1(pi)
28 CPMi = CPMi + reserve.qi(pi)
29 eCPMi = eQi.CPMi
30 return eCPM, eQ
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to the expected cost per impression. If for all j > i, pij < 1 then we set j = I + 1 and we assume
that I + 1 is an agent who is never getting filtered and has a bid equal to the reserve price. Note
that we also compute qi,k(pi) from qi,k−1(pi) in O(1), instead of computing it for each k from scratch.
When i > 1 and pii < 1, we use the previous expected cost per impression that we had from
the previous agent (lets call it CPMi−1) to calculate the cost per impression of agent i (CPMi) by
doing the following calculation
CPMi =
CPMi−1 − piibi
1− pii
This operation nullifies the effect of agent i in the cost per impression of the previous agent (i− 1)
and calculates the new expected cost per impression. Finally, we set eCPMi = eQi.CPMi. Note
that even though the running time of this algorithm may be O(I) for some agents, the total
(amortized) running time of these calculations for all the agents combined is still O(I). So overall
the algorithm requires amortized O(1) number of calculations for each agent and it takes linear
time (O(I)) to calculate eCPM and eQ for all the agents, given the sorted list of agents based on
their bids. Since we need to sort the agents by their bids at the beginning, the total running time
of each iteration in computing the filtering probabilities is O(I log(I)). This improvement in the
running time (from O(I2I) to O(I)) is crucial for simulating the outcome of the auction, specially
in the auctions where the number of agents is big.
B Bid recommendation tool.
To help the advertisers, the platform also provides a bid-recommendation platform-provided bid
recommendation. The agents in this market are real-estate agents, who often don’t have the data
or the analytic tools to do a good job optimizing their bid. In addition, the market participants
are real estate agents for whom Zillow may not be the main channel through which they get the
“client leads”. As a result, some agents may be reluctant to engage in active exploration of optimal
bidding in the auction market for user impressions. In order to facilitate the bidding for those
agents, the platform has developed a tool that recommends the bid for a given bidder based on
this bidder’s monthly budget. The tool was designed to set the bid that maximizes the expected
number of impressions that a given bidder gets given her budget. We now outline the design details
of this tool.
For each actual realization of the group of competing bidders, we define the cost function
CPMj(bj) as a mapping from the bid of bidder j to the price she pays per impression in an
auction. Recall that we defined Qj(bj) as a probability of being allocated an impression as an
outcome of an auction conditioned on that the agent wasn’t filtered. Note that without the effect
of filtering both functions are step functions: whenever bidder j outbids bidder ranked i but ranks
below bidder ranked i−1, then this bidder j pays the price determined by i bj between bi and bi−1.
In figures 9,10 we illustrate the concept of price and the impression probability using the bidders
in one of our 6 markets and take the bidder ranked 4 in the first week in the market and bid of 30
(recall that the price units were resealed not to reflect the actual market prices). The figure shows
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Figure 9: Spent (agent’s bid in red) Figure 10: Impression share (agent’s bid in red)
the price and the impression share that this bidder gets if all other bidders are made eligible for
this impression.
We note that the bidder under consideration has a per impression budget significantly below
the cost of an impression (as much as a factor of 10 below). If the eligibility status for impressions
was recorded by the system, then we could compute the empirical fraction of impressions where
this given bidder was made eligible for an auction: divide the number of impressions where a given
bidder was made eligible for an auction by the total number of arrived impressions. Depending on
the impression volume, this can be computed using all impressions from the beginning of the month
or some smaller window of time (e.g. the week before). This would be our estimated probability
pij of actually getting displayed for an impression.
Expected spent and expected impression allocations If many bidders are affected by the
budget smoothing than the participation of bidders in an auction is random (where randomness
is activated by the budget smoothing mechanism). The for each impression instead of the actual
spent and the impression share we will have the expected spent and the impression share, where
the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of participation of competing bidders.
Given the filtering probabilities, the expected spent and expected impression share are represented
by the expectation of spent and impression shares in all possible bidder configurations which are
then weighted by the probabilities of those configurations. The participation of each bidder i in a
given auction can be represented by a binary variable where 1 indicates that the bidder is made
eligible for the auction and 0 means that the bidder was made ineligible due to budget smoothing.
Then the set of all possible participating bids can be represented by an array of 2I binary I-digit
numbers from {0, 0, . . . , 0} to {1, 1, . . . , 1}. Call the set of elements in this array N . Then a subset
of elements of N where i-th digit is equal to 1 corresponds to the configurations where bidder i is
made eligible for an auction. Call this set Ni. Then the expected cost and the expected impression
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share are computed as
eCPMi(bi) =
∑
N∈Ni
γNi
∏
j 6=i
pi
nNj
j (1− pij)n
N
j PRICENi (bi), (B.3)
and
eQi(bi) =
∑
N∈Ni
∏
j 6=i
pi
nNj
j (1− pij)n
N
j γNi ,
where N corresponds to the index of the set of eligible of bidders.
Computation of filtering probabilities If the impression allocations are not available, then
the probabilities of participation of bidders in impressions have to be computed. We can consider
the actual budget smoothing as an iterative process: we continuously evaluate the actual spent for
each bidder and when the spent exceeds the allocated budget, then the bidder is made ineligible
for some impressions. This iterative process reaches the steady state when the expected spent in
an impression for a given bidder becomes equal to the budget:
pii × eCPMi(bi) = Budgeti.
We can simulate this iterative process for the bidder in one of our selected markets. Note that that
bidder has a very low per impression budget of 3.87. We start the process assuming that all the
bidders are eligible for an impression. Then using the spent in that impression, we compute the
filtering probabilities for all by dividing the budget by the spent and then iterate the process to set
pii =
Budgeti
eCPMi(bi)
using the previous iteration values of the eligibility probabilities. The algorithm for computing the
probabilities of being displayed on the page is the following.
Iteration 0: Initialize probabilities of being eligible for an impression at pi
(0)
i = 1.
Iteration k: Take the probabilities of being eligible for an impression pi
(k−1)
i computed from the
previous iteration. Compute eCPM from (B.3) for each bidder i = 1, . . . , I. If eCPMi(bi) = 0,
then set the probability pii = 1 (bidder is always displayed, this bidder never gets any impressions
as an outcome of the auction). If eCPMi(bi) > 0, then set
pi
(k)
i = min
{
1,
Budgeti
eCPMi(bi)
}
.
Stopping criterion: Stop when the probabilities become close across the iterations: maxi |pi(k)i −
pi
(k−1)
i | < , for a given tolerance criterion.
We illustrate the trajectory across the iterations the bidder of interest on the following figure.
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Figure 11: Iteration path for probability of eligibility, eCPM and expected spent
At the end of the iterative process the expected spent approaches the budget due to the increase
in the filtering probability. Note that the expected CPM significantly increases in response to the
change in the filtering probabilities for all other bidders.
The randomness increases the eCPM and the probability of allocation into an impression as
compared to the fully deterministic case (i.e. when bidders are not randomly removed from impres-
sions due to budget smoothing). The figure below demonstrates the expected CPM and expected
fraction of impressions (after budget smoothing) for bidder with bid of 30 and per impression
budget of 3.87.
Figure 12: Spent (actual bid in red) Figure 13: Impression fraction (actual bid in red)
Note that an increase in the auction outcomes (probability of being allocated an impression and
the eCPM is compensated with a decrease in the probability of being eligible for an auction).
Computation of the optimal bid for impression ROI optimizers We note that the eCPM
and allocation probabilities are monotone functions of the bid. As a result, if a given bidder
maximizes the probability of appearing in an impression as a function of the bid, the optimal bid
will be set such that (a) the expected spent does not exceed the per impression budget; (b) an
increase in the bid will result in an increase in the spent exceeding the budget. Note that the
spent is (non-strictly) monotone increasing until it reaches the level of the per impression budget
and then it stays at the level equal to the budget due to budget smoothing. Assuming that the
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bidders do not have the “values of residual budget”, this means that the bidder whose budget per
impression exceeds any other budgets should set the bid at the level equal to the budget. Note
that the deviation from this strategy will not be optimal: a decrease in the bid for such a bidder
results in “budget savings” that have no value for this bidder, but at the same time it will result
in a (weak) decrease in the number of impressions.
The tool that computes the optimal best response for such a bidder proceeds in the following
way.
Construction of the grid of bids We construct the grid of bids of opponent bidders. These
are the points where the spent function exhibits jumps.
Construction of the eCPM curve We construct the eCPM curve. By choosing a small 
(smaller than the minimum distance between the closest score-weighted bids), we evaluate the
changes in the eCPM after a given bidder outbids and under-bids the opponent by .
Computation of the optimal bid Set the bid to the level where the eCPM curve intersects
the horizontal line corresponding to the budget.
Adjustment of the bid for top/bottom bidders The top bidder sets the bid at the level
equal to the per impression budget, the bottom bidder sets the bid to the maximum level that
makes the spent positive.
Note that if there are I bidders, this approach amounts to 2×I evaluations of the eCPM function.
The picture below demonstrates the shift to the optimal bid for the bidder under consideration by
equating this bidder’s eCPM with the per impression budget.
Figure 14: Optimization of impression ROI
Figure 15: The impact of budget smoothing on
expected spent
We note what happens to the actual spent of the bidder whenever the bid exceeds the rec-
ommended level. Given that at the recommended level the bidder’s spent is at or below the per
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impression budget, if the bid increases then the budget smoothing gets initiated. The overall spent
per impression is equal to the product of the probability of being eligible for an auction (pii) and
the expected outcome of an auction (eCPMi(bi))
pii eCPMi(bi).
Thus, whenever the budget smoothing is initiated (pii < 1) then the spent is exactly equal to the
budget. Thus the spent as a function of the bid will become flat once the optimal bid has been
exceeded.
The probability of being allocated an impression is equal to the product of the probability
of being eligible for an auction (pii) and the probability of being allocated an impression as an
outcome of an auction (eQi(bi)). We note that since the GSP is monotone, the probability of
being allocated an impression as an outcome of an auction increases in the bid: the higher the
bid, the higher the probability of being displayed. When the budget smoothing is not initiated,
then pii = 1 and the probability of appearing on the page is simply eQi(bi) (increasing in the bid).
When the bid exceeds the optimal level, then the probability of being eligible for an impression is
pii = Budgeti/eCPMi(bi) leading to the probability of being allocated an impression of
Budgeti ×
eQi(bi)
eCPMi(bi)
.
This function decreases as a function of bid. This means that if the per impression budget does
not warrant a given bidder the top position without filtering, then the probability of getting an im-
pression increases up to the optimal bid level and then decreases whenever the bid starts exceeding
the optimal level.
Budget and bid recommendations based on the impression targets We can use the
“expected impression” model to make the recommendations for the choice of the monthly budget
and the corresponding bid that meet a given impression target. Note that due to the budget
smoothing, the expected spent in a given impression
Spenti(bi) = pii eCPMi(bi) ≤ Budgeti.
The inequality may not be binding due to the possible jumps in the eCPM curve. We note that
the expected probability of appearing in the impression is
Probi (bi, Budgeti) = pii eQi(bi).
Consider this probability as a function of the bid and the budget, taking into account our model
of filtering due to budget smoothing.
Probi (bi, Budgeti) =
{
eQi(bi), if eCPMi(bi) ≤ Budgeti,
Budgeti
eQi(bi)
eCPMi(bi)
, if eCPMi(bi) > Budgeti.
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The expected impression count is obtained by multiplying the probability of appearing on the page
Probi (bi, Budgeti) by the total projected impression inventory. Note that function Probi (bi, Budgeti)
is increasing in the bid bi up to the bid b
∗
i (Budgeti) such that
eCPMi (b
∗
i (Budgeti)) = Budgeti
and decreases when the bid is greater than b∗i (Budgeti). Therefore, the expected number of im-
pressions is maximized for a given budget at bi = b
∗
i (Budgeti).
Let Inventory be the total impression inventory and Goali be the impression target for bidder
i. Then the optimum bid for a given budget is set as
Probi (bi, Budgeti) ≤
Goali
Inventory
.
The minimum budget per impression for which the impression goal is met is
Budgeti = eCPMi(bi),
leading to
eQi(bi) =
Goali
Inventory
.
To determine the recommendations of the bid and the budget based on the expressions above, we
formulate the following problem: find the profile of the probabilities of eligibility for an auction
pi1, pi2, . . . , piI and the optimal bid of bidder i b
∗
i such that
1. pii = 1 for bidder of interest i;
2. eQi(b
∗
i ) =
Goali
Inventory.
Note that this is equivalent to solving a system of equations
pij = min
{
Budgetj
eCPMj(bj)
, 1
}
, j 6= i,
pii = 1,
eQi(b
∗
i ) =
Goali
Inventory .
(B.4)
with unknowns pij , j 6= i and b∗i . The recommended bid is the solution b∗i and the budget recom-
mendation is given by multiplying the per impression budget
Budget∗i = eCPMi(b
∗
i )
by the projected impression inventory.
We also need to account for possible corner solutions that do not allow the equality eQi(b
∗
i ) =
Goali
Inventory to be satisfied. First, suppose that for the grid of bids {b
g
k =
sk bk
si
}Ik=1 we observe
max
k
eQi(b
g
k) <
Goali
Inventory
.
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Then the optimal bid b∗i = maxk b
g
k. In that case we set the budget Budget
∗
i = b
∗
i > eCPMi(b
∗
i ).
The rationale for this is that the top bidder does not have an incentive to set the bid below the
budget as that would lead to a weak decrease in the expected number of impressions while not
decreasing the expected spent.
Second, suppose that
min
k
eQi(b
g
k) >
Goali
Inventory
.
In that case for any bid level the bidder will be subject to budget smoothing. Thus the optimal
bid will correspond to
b∗i = min
k
bgk.
The recommended budget will correspond to
Budget∗i =
Goali
Inventory
eCPMi(b
∗
i )
eQi(b∗i )
.
Simultaneous optimization for multiple bidders The automated optimization for multiple
bidders is based on a simple generalization of the single bidder problem. We note that for all
bidders whose bids and budgets are optimized to meet the impression goals, we need to solve a
system of equations equivalent to (B.4) to find bids b∗j . Let J be the subset of bidders who use
the bid and budget recommendation. Then we find the set of recommended bids {b∗j , j ∈ J } by
solving the system of equations
pik = min
{
eCPMk(bk)
Budgetk
, 1
}
, k 6∈ J ,
pik = 1, k ∈ J
eQk(b
∗
k) =
Goalk
Inventory , k ∈ J .
(B.5)
We also take into account the “corner solutions” corresponding to very low and very high
impression goals relative to the available inventory.
Formal integrity tests for tool performance The structure of the rank-based auction leads
to the set of properties that have to be satisfied by the optimal solutions for bids and budgets. We
can use these properties to construct the tests for the performance of the recommendation tool.
1. For any τ > 0, if bk, k = 1, . . . , I is the solution of (B.5), then if the filtering probabilities are
fixed, then the replacement of bk with τ bk does not change the predicted impression counts
eQk(τ bk)× Inventory.
2. For any τ > 0, if bk, k = 1, . . . , I is the solution of (B.5), then if the filtering probabilities are
fixed, then the replacement of bk with τ bk leads to the proportional increase in the predicted
total spent eCPMk(τ bk)× Inventory = τ eCPMk(bk)× Inventory.
3. For any τ > 0, if the inventory changes to τ Inventory and all impression goals change to
τ Goali, then the optimal bids and per impression recommended budgets remain the same.
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4. The ratio eQi(bi)eCPMi(bi) is a (weakly) monotone decreasing function of the bid. In other words,
for grid points {bgk}Ik=1, bgm > bgn should lead to eQi(b
g
m)
eCPMi(b
g
m)
< eQi(b
g
n)
eCPMi(b
g
n)
.
C Methodology for estimation of values and regret.
Recall the notion of regret and rationalizable set from Section 4. The structure of the rationalizable
set for 9 of the bidders most frequently changing bids in each of the 6 markets we analyzed is shown
in Figures 17-19. The rationality assumption of the inequality (4.2) models players who may be
learning from experience while participating in the game. We assume that the strategies bit and
environment parameters θt are input simultaneously, so agent i cannot pick his strategy dependent
on the state of nature θt or the strategies of other agents b−i,t. This makes the standard of a single
best strategy b natural, as chosen strategies cannot depend on θt or b−i,t. Beyond this, we do not
make any assumption on what information is available for the agents, and how they choose their
strategies.
We can specialize the definition of the rationalizable set in (4.2) to auctions for randomly
arriving impressions by introducing functions
∆eCPMi(b
′) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
eCPMit(b
′)− eCPMit(bit)
)
, and ∆eQi(b
′) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
eQit(b
′)− eQit(bit)
)
,
(C.6)
corresponding to an aggregate outcome in T time periods from switching to a fixed bid b′ from the
actually applied bid sequence {bit}Tt=1. The -regret condition reduces to:
∀b′ ∈ R+ : vi ·∆eQi(b′) ≤ ∆eCPMi(b′) + i (C.7)
for each bidder i. Hence, the rationalizable set NR is an envelope of the family of half planes
obtained by varying b ∈ R+ in Equation (C.7).
Under suitable assumptions regarding the expected auction outcomes eQit(·) and eCMPit(·) in
bidder i’s bid, such as continuity and monotonicity, one can establish basic geometric properties of
the rationalizable set, such as its convexity and closedness. Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015)
find a simple geometric characterization of the NR set that also implies an efficient algorithm for
computing that set. Since closed convex bounded sets are fully characterized by their boundaries,
we can use the notion of the support function to represent the boundary of the set NR. The support
function of a closed convex set X is h(X,u) = supx∈X〈x, u〉, where in our case X = NR is a subset
of R2 or value and error pairs (vi, i), and then u is also an element of R2.
An important property of the support function is the way it characterizes closed convex bounded
sets. Denote by dH(A,B) the Hausdorf distance between convex compact sets A and B. Recall
that the Hausdorf norm for subsets A and B of the metric space E with metric ρ(·, ·) is defined as
dH(A,B) = max{sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
ρ(a, b), sup
b∈B
inf
a∈A
ρ(a, b)}.
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It turns out that dH(A,B) = supu |h(A, u)− h(B, u)|. Therefore, if we find h(NR, u), this will be
equivalent to characterizing NR itself. The following result fully characterizes the support function
of the set NR based on the aggregate auction ouctomes ∆eCPMi(·) and ∆eQi(·):
THEOREM 1 Under monotonicity of ∆eCPMi(·) and ∆eQi(·) the support function of NR is
function h : {(u1, u2) : u1, u2 ∈ R, u21 + u22 = 1} 7→ R+ such that
h(NR, u) =
{
|u2|∆eQi
(
∆eCPM−1i
(
u1
|u2|
))
, ifu2 < 0, if
u1
|u2| ∈ [infb ∆eCPMi, supb ∆eCPMi(b)]
+∞, otherwise.
This theorem is the identification result for valuations and algorithm parameters for -regret
learning algorithms. Unlike equilibrium settings that we discussed above, we cannot pin-point the
values of players. At the same time, the characterization of the set NR reduces to evaluation of two
one-dimensional functions. We can use efficient numerical approximation for such an evaluation.
The shape of the set NR will generally depend on the parameters of a concrete algorithm used for
learning. Thus the analysis of the geometry of NR can help us not only to estimate valuations of
players but the learning algorithm as well.
The inference for the set NR reduces to the characterization of its support functions which only
requires to evaluate the function ∆eQi
(
∆eCPM−1i (·)
)
. It is a one-dimensional function and can
be estimated from the data via direct simulation.
Since our object of interest is the set NR we need to characterize the distance between the
true set NR and the set N̂R that is obtained from subsampling the data. Nekipelov, Syrgka-
nis, and Tardos (2015) show that the characterization of the properties of the estimated ratio-
nalizable set reduces to the description of the properties of a single dimensional function f(·) =
∆eQi
(
∆eCPM−1i (·)
)
. and let f̂(·) be its empirical analog recovered from the data. The set NR is
characterized by its support function h(NR, u). Then using the relationship between the Hausedorf
norm and the sup-norm of the support functions we can write
dH(N̂R, NR) = sup
‖u‖=1
|h(N̂R, u)− h(NR, u)| ≤ sup
z
∣∣∣f̂ (z)− f (z)∣∣∣ ,
The empirical analog of function f(·) can be directly estimated from the data via subsampling
of auctions. The properties of the estimated set N̂R are thus determined by the properties of
function f(·). In particular, if function f has derivative up to order k ≥ 0 and for some L ≥ 0,
|f (k)(z1) − f (k)(z2)| ≤ L|z1 − z2|α, then with probability approaching 1 the Hausedorf distance
between the true and estimated rationalizable set can be bounded as
dH(N̂R, NR) ≤ O((N−1 log N)γ/(2γ+1)), γ = k + α
with probability approaching 1 as N → ∞, where N = n × T is the total number of samples
available (with T auctions and n players in each).
D Additional tables and figures.
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Figure 16: Average fraction of time agents follow the recommended bid separated by clusters and
regions.
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Region 1
Region 2
Figure 17: Rationalizable set for 9 agents most frequently changing bids
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Region 3
Region 4
Figure 18: Rationalizable set for 9 agents most frequently changing bids
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Region 5
Region 6
Figure 19: Rationalizable set for 9 agents most frequently changing bids
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